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United States Policy and Nuclear Abolition

by Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.

US Navy (Ret.)

An address to the Olaf Palme Institute in Stockholm, Sweden on May 12, 1998

You are certainly aware that the United States is committed under Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith for nuclear disarmament. You are probably also aware that last year President Clinton approved a policy that nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone of U.S. security for the indefinite future. It is very difficult to reconcile these conflicting positions. Disarm or maintain a massive nuclear war fighting capability? It is impossible to do both. My purpose here is to explain why President Clinton made his decision, what it means to prospects for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and what can be done to promote progress toward a non-nuclear world.

First, let me tell you why I am here to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have been personally involved with these engines of destruction since the beginning of the nuclear era. 42 years ago I was a pilot prepared to destroy a European target with a bomb that would have killed 600,000 people. 20 years ago, as the Director of U.S. Military Operations in Europe, I was the officer responsible for the security, readiness and employment of 7,000 nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Russia, weapons which could never defend anything - only destroy everything. My knowledge of nuclear weapons has convinced me that they can never be used for any rational military or political purpose. Their use would only create barbaric, indiscriminate destruction. In the words of the Canberra Commission, "Nuclear weapons create an intolerable threat to all humanity..." Now, to address the reasons for President Clinton's decision concerning the U.S. nuclear posture. When the nuclear era opened in the U.S. the atom bomb was seen as a source of immense national power and as an essential contribution to efforts to thwart any expansionist efforts by Stalin's Soviet Union. It was also seen by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force- as the key to service supremacy. The newly autonomous Air Force under General Curtis LeMay saw atomic warfare as its primary *raison d'etre* and fought fiercely for the dominant role in U.S. atomic plans. The Army and Navy feared that without atomic weapons in their arsenals they would become irrelevant adjuncts to strategic air power.

This interservice rivalry led to the rapid proliferation of nuclear missions. Without going into needless detail, each service acquired its own arsenal of nuclear weapons for every conceivable military mission: strategic bombardment, tactical warfare, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank rockets and landmines, anti-submarine rockets, torpedoes and depth charges, artillery shells, intermediate range missiles and ultimately intercontinental range land and sea-launched ballistic missiles armed with multiple, thermo-nuclear warheads.

The Soviet Union, starting more than 4 years behind America, watched this rapid expansion of our war fighting weapons with shock and fear and set out to match every U.S. capability. Despite the obvious fact that the USSR lagged far behind, alarmists in the Pentagon pointed at Soviet efforts as proof of the need for ever more nuclear forces and weapons and the arms race continued unabated for 40 years.

During this wasteful dangerous competition the United States built 70,000 nuclear weapons plus air, land and sea-based delivery vehicles at a total cost of \$4.000 billion dollars.

As the Soviets' arsenal grew, Mutual Assured Destruction became a fact and the two nations finally began tenuous arms control efforts in the 1960's to restrain their competition. This effort was accelerated in the mid-1980 as a result of world-wide fears of nuclear war when President Reagan spoke of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and doubled U.S. military spending. Unfortunately, the excesses of the nuclear arms race had created an extremely powerful pro-nuclear weapons establishment in the United States. This alliance of laboratories, weapon builders, aircraft industries and missile producers wielded immense political power in opposition to nuclear disarmament proposals. Abetted by Generals and Admirals in the Pentagon this establishment was able to turn arms control efforts into a talk-test-build process in which talks went slowly and ineffectually while testing and building went on with great dispatch. This same establishment remains extremely powerful today and explains why the United States' continues to spend more than \$28,000 million dollars each year to sustain its nuclear war fighting forces and enhance its weapons despite the formal commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to take effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament. Pressure from the establishment is the primary reason why in November, 1997, President Clinton decreed in Presidential Decision Directive #60 that nuclear weapons will continue to form the cornerstone of American security indefinitely. This directive also set forth a number of other policies that are directly contrary to the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear abolition. He reaffirmed America's right to make first use of nuclear weapons and intentionally left open the option to conduct nuclear retaliation against any nation, which employs chemical or biological agents in attacks against the United States or its allies. He went on to direct the maintenance of the triad of U.S. strategic forces (long range bombers, land-based ICBM's and submarine-based SLBMs) at a high state of alert which would permit launch-on-warning of any impending nuclear attack on the U.S. This is the dangerous doctrine, which puts thousands of warheads on a hair trigger, thereby creating the risk of starting a nuclear war through misinformation and fear as well as through human error or system malfunction.

Finally, his directive specifically authorized the continued targeting of numerous sites in Russia and China as well as planning for strikes against so-called rogue states in connection with regional conflicts or crises. In short, U.S. nuclear posture and planning remain essentially unchanged seven years after the end of the Cold War. The numbers of weapons are lower but the power to annihilate remains in place with 7,000 strategic and 5,000 tactical weapons.

This doctrine would be bad enough alone but it is reinforced by continued efforts to extend and enhance the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. A major element of this process is benignly labeled the Stockpile Stewardship Program costing more than \$4, 100 million per year to maintain weapons security as well as test and replace weapon components to insure full wartime readiness of approximately 12,000 strategic and tactical bombs and warheads. In March the U.S. Air Force dropped two B61-11 bombs from a B-2 bomber on a target in Alaska to complete certification of a new design for earth penetrating weapons, clear proof of U.S. intentions to improve its nuclear war fighting capabilities.

Furthermore, the Los Alamos National Laboratory recently resumed the manufacture of plutonium triggers for thermo-nuclear weapons while the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is preparing a new capability called the National Ignition Facility where conditions within an exploding nuclear device can be simulated. Supplemented with continuing sub-critical explosive tests in Nevada and extremely sophisticated computer modeling experiments, this new facility will give the U.S. means not available to other signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to develop and validate new nuclear weapons designs.

To give even more evidence of the power of the pro-nuclear establishment, the U.S. will decide this year -on how and when to resume the production and stockpiling of tritium, the indispensable fuel for thermo-nuclear explosions. The fact is that the military has enough tritium on hand today for all of its weapons until the year 2006 and enough for 1,000 warheads and bombs at least until the year 2024. To invest thousands of millions of dollars for unneeded tritium is a waste of precious resources undertaken solely to placate and reward the nuclear establishment. It is particularly alarming and discouraging to see the United States investing heavily to perpetuate and increase its nuclear war fighting capabilities when only three years ago it was the dominant force promoting indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To encourage support for extension the U.S. led in the formulation of the important declaration of "Principles and Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." More clearly than Article VI of the NPT itself, this statement reaffirmed commitment to: "The determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons..." This renewed and strengthened pledge to reduce nuclear capabilities offered as an inducement for non-nuclear states to agree to extension of the NPT makes the current U.S. nuclear program an affront to all of the signatories. It is not only a direct violation of both the letter and spirit of the NPT; it is a provocation, which jeopardizes the goal of non-proliferation. The clear message is that the foremost nuclear power regards its weapons as key elements of security and military strength, a signal, which can only stimulate other nations to consider the need to create similar capabilities.

What must those who favor nuclear abolition do to counter this threat to non-proliferation? First, as individuals and as organizations, we must redouble our efforts at home to publicize the dangers created by as many as 35,000 weapons still ready for use in the world. A broadly based global demand by all non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers must live up to the letter and spirit of the NPT extension agreement should precede the first review conference in the year 2000. A call for worldwide public demonstrations on the order and magnitude of those, which supported the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980's, should be made. The nuclear powers must not be permitted to dictate the results of the review conference in the same manner the United States dominated the 1995 extension conference. The message to be stressed is that it is illogical and unrealistic to expect that five nations can legally possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons indefinitely while all other nations are forbidden to create a nuclear capability. Pressure to break-out of the Non Proliferation Treaty is further intensified because one of the nuclear powers is actively developing new, more threatening weapons and pronouncing them essential to its future security.

A good strategy is to follow the lead of the [62 Generals and Admirals](#) who signed an appeal for nuclear abolition in December of 1996. We stated that we could not foresee the conditions, which would ultimately permit the final elimination of all weapons, but we did recognize many steps, which could be safely begun now to start and accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal.

As a first step toward nuclear disarmament, all nuclear powers should positively commit themselves to unqualified no-first use guarantees for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Their guarantees should be incorporated in a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the review conference in 2000.

Concurrently, the process of actual reduction of weapons should begin with the United States and Russia. They should proceed immediately with START III negotiations, particularly since the implementation of START II has been delayed for four years. Even with the delay Russia cannot afford all of the changes required under that Treaty and has suggested willingness to proceed with additional reductions because far deeper reductions by both sides would be less costly.

At the same time, both nations should agree to take thousands of nuclear warheads off of alert status. This action would reduce the possibility of a nuclear exchange

initiated by accident or human error. Once fully de-alerted, warhead removal (de-mating) should commence and the warheads stored remotely from missile sites and submarine bases. Verification measures should include international participation to build confidence between the parties.

Disassembly of warheads under international supervision should begin in the U.S. and Russia. When a level of 1,000 warheads is reached in each nation, Great Britain, France and China should join the process under a rigorous verification regime. De facto nuclear states, including Israel, should join the process as movement continued toward the complete and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. Finally, an international convention should be adopted to prohibit the manufacture, possession or use of nuclear explosive devices just as current conventions proscribe chemical and biological weapons. All fissile material should be safely and securely stored under international control.

Verification of this entire process could best be accomplished by U.N. teams formed and operating in accordance with principles developed by UNSCOM teams operating in Iraq today. This model provides a precedent already accepted by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the nuclear powers.

None of these progressive steps will happen until the community of nations comes together to make the United States understand that non-proliferation will ultimately fail unless the U.S. abandons its delusion that nuclear superiority provides long term security. Even when the dangers of this delusion are understood, progress toward the complete, final abolition of nuclear weapons will be painfully slow. Nevertheless, the effort must be made to move toward the day that all nations live together in a world without nuclear weapons because it is clear that our children cannot hope to live safely in a world with them.

* **Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.** US Navy, Ret. Carroll's service included the Korean Conflict and Viet Nam War. Promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in 1972, he served as Commander of Task Force 60, the carrier striking force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. His last assignment on active duty was in the Pentagon as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, engaged in U.S. naval planning for conventional and nuclear war. Presently he is the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.

In an address to the [Olaf Palme Institute \[http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/carroll-sweden.html\]](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/carroll-sweden.html) in Stockholm, Sweden in May 1998, Admiral told of his personal involvement with nuclear weapons and offered his conclusions about their utility. He said:

First, let me tell you why I am here to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have been personally involved with these engines of destruction since the beginning of the nuclear era. 42 years ago I was a pilot prepared to destroy a European target with a bomb that would have killed 600,000 people. 20 years ago, as the Director of U.S. Military Operations in Europe, I was the officer responsible for the security, readiness and employment of 7,000 nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Russia, weapons which could never defend anything - only destroy everything.

My knowledge of nuclear weapons has convinced me that they can never be used for any rational military or political purpose. Their use would only create barbaric, indiscriminate destruction.

In his speech Admiral Carroll outlined a series of steps that could lead to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. These steps include:

- Unqualified non-first use guarantees for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.
- START III negotiations for deep reductions by the United States and Russia.
- Take thousands of nuclear warheads off of alert status.
- Verification measures with international participation.
- Disassembly of warheads under international supervision.
- Great Britain, France, China, and de facto nuclear states, including Israel, should join the process.
- An international convention should be adopted to prohibit the manufacture, possession or use of nuclear explosive devices.

Admiral Carroll dealt with this subject again in an address "America's Future" Confrontation or Cooperation?", given to the World Federalist Association in November 1998. He stated:

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. (USN ret.) was commissioned an ensign in 1945 just before the end of World War II. He served with combat units engaged in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Promoted to rear admiral in 1972, he served as commander of Task Force 60, the carrier striking force of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. His last assignment on active duty was at the Pentagon engaged in U.S. naval planning for conventional and nuclear war. Upon his retirement from the Navy, he worked many years for the Center for Defense Information, serving as deputy director.

Admiral Carroll has spoken widely for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He dealt with this subject in "America's Future" Confrontation or Cooperation?", an address to the World Federalist Association in November 1998. He stated:

Empires rise and fall. Alliances wax and wane. Wars erupt and subside -- with few long term changes or benefits. In attempting to perpetuate a concept of foreign relations based on military power, the United States is wasting a priceless opportunity to move from a confrontational posture to a cooperative one.

Jonathan Schell's latest book, "The Gift of Time," focuses on the need to get rid of nuclear weapons while there is no active threat to American security except nuclear weapons. By extension, we can use the gift of time to build a new, long term approach to security in the 21st Century.

On that point, let me draw an analogy between the need to get rid of all nuclear weapons and the need to achieve a cooperative world community of nations living together in peace and governed under the rule of law. The first similarity is that no one, no individual or group, is wise enough today to say how or when we can actually achieve either goal. It is impossible today to foresee or prescribe all the conditions which must exist before nuclear weapons are abolished; or, a system of global governance established.

Today the realities are that the most powerful nation on earth declares that nuclear weapons are the cornerstone of our security and the same nation refuses to surrender the smallest scintilla of national sovereignty in the conduct of international relations. How do ideals triumph over such realities? My answer is the same for both efforts. One step at a time.

With respect to nuclear abolition

- we begin by working for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- we work for the universal declaration of a no first-use policy;
- we work for the de-alerting of strategic weapons;
- we work for separation of warheads from delivery vehicles;
- we work for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals until 37,000 weapons become 5,000 and then 1,000 and then 500.

Then we hope that those who follow us will be wise enough to work out the means of eliminating the last nuclear weapons on earth.

Can we be certain of success? No, but we can be certain that as we proceed the world will become progressively safer each step of the way. As the danger of nuclear catastrophe fades, each successive step will become more obvious and more beneficial until the rewards of abolition are irresistible and inevitable.

Under Military Leaders Speak Out: for Admiral Noel Gayler, add the following to what's already there:

In The Nuclear Crisis Reader Admiral Gayler contributed a second article, "The Way Out: A General Nuclear Settlement" (pp. 234-243). Writing in 1984 when the Soviet Union and the United States were engaged in intense nuclear rivalry, he presented six elements of a general nuclear settlement:

- Make an end to the intemperate, childish and threaten rhetoric between us.
- Give up nuclear war-fighting doctrines. The three most dangerous doctrines are:
First use against conventional force.
Counterforce, sometimes called "prompt hard target kill".
Protracted or "winnable" nuclear war. There can be no winners.
- Improve communications of every kind.
- A mutual moratorium on the further development, testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons.
- Avoid the extension of nuclear war capability in to new areas, whether technical or spatial (that is, exporting war to space).
- We and the Soviets need to make deep, fast and continuing cuts in the number of nuclear weapons of all kinds.

In this article Admiral Gayler advocated a scheme for weapons conversion whereby:

Each country hands over progressively larger numbers of explosive nuclear fission devices to a single conversion facility, built explicitly for this purpose, at a neutral site.

*Admiral Gayler returned to this subject in recent years in **A Proposal for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons** [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/00.12/gayler-proposal_for_achieving_zero_nuclear_weapons.html], posted on the web site of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He wrote:*

Process, as opposed to negotiating numbers, is the basic principle of the proposal that I suggest. It is nothing less than drastic: the continuing reduction to zero of weapons in the hands of avowed nuclear powers, plus an end to the nuclear ambitions of others.

The proposal: Let weapons be delivered to a single point, there to be dismantled, the nuclear material returned to the donors for use or disposal, and the weapons destroyed.

This process, once underway, will be nearly impossible to stop, since its obvious merits, political and substantive, will compel support. The "single point" may well be a floating

platform, at sea, in international waters. A handy platform can be an aircraft carrier that has been removed from “mothballs” and disarmed, yet capable of steaming to the desired location and operating support aircraft and ships to handle heavier loads.

Admiral Gayler in this article dispels some common illusions about nuclear weapons:

- **Is physical defense against nuclear weapons possible? No.** What’s more, it’s irrelevant. A half dozen non-technical means of delivery avail.
- **Can nuclear weapons be used in any sensible manner? No.** This includes “tactical.”
- **Does nuclear disarmament imperil our security? No.** It enhances it.
- **Is deterrence of nuclear or other attack by threat of retaliation still possible? No.** The many potential aggressors are scattered — even location unknown. No targets!

Admiral Noel Gayler

[photo] *Admiral Noel Gayler, U.S. Navy (ret.) served during World War II as a carrier fighter pilot. His subsequent sea commands included fighter and experimental squadrons, and carriers. From 1972 until his retirement as a four-star admiral he was Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific. In 1984 Admiral Gayler offered "A Commander-in-Chief's Perspective on Nuclear Weapons" in The Nuclear Crisis Reader (Gwyn Prins, editor; New York, Vintage Books, 1984, pp. 16-18).*

Let me begin by stating my main proposition plainly, so that there may be no misunderstanding. It is my view that there is no sensible military use for nuclear weapons, whether "strategic" weapons, "tactical" weapons, "theater" weapons, weapons at sea or weapons in space....

Taking the Pacific first, when I was Commander-in-Chief (Pacific) I could not find, in scrutinizing the whole of the Pacific command, any area where it would conceivably have made sense to explode nuclear weapons in order to carry our military objectives. Clearly our experience in the Vietnam War suggests that we would not do such a thing. We did not do even "conventional" things which were well within our capability because of understandable political and humane considerations.

Nor could I see a case for nuclear weapons anywhere else on the Asian continent. For example, the Korean Demilitarized Zone is one flashpoint that comes immediately to mind. My evaluation, together with that of senior generals, both Korean and American, responsible for the defense of the Demilitarized Zone and of the city of Seoul and its approach and environs, was that it simply was not necessary to contemplate a nuclear strategy. The potential channels of attack on Seoul are highly concentrated, the defenses are well in place, and Seoul itself is protected by a river in front of it....

Furthermore, with respect to the Asian continent as a whole, we have to face the fact that there is a political consideration of overwhelming importance. The only use of nuclear weapons has been against an Asiatic people....[It] is my belief that the use of a nuclear weapon against any Asian people, for any purpose whatsoever, would polarize Asia against us. It would clearly not be worth the candle. For all these reasons I saw no need for nuclear weapons in the Pacific theater, and I so stated.

Another potential theater, of course, is maritime Russia: the Soviet naval forces dispersed through the Pacific area, their bases, lines of transit, choke points. All I would say about that is that, while it is an important place, it is less important than the entire problem that would be involved if you were actually to fight Russia....

In the Middle East, there have been various scenarios proposed, including the initiative use of nuclear weapons to block certain passes down into Iran and so forth. Pacific Command did a considerable study of that potentiality and came to the conclusion that we were so outgunned by the Soviets in nuclear delivery capabilities and in respect to the small number of highly critical targets we owned, compared with the very large number of less critical targets that they had, that it was not something that we should open up, on strictly military grounds.

I am now going to turn....to NATO. I have seen some pretty persuasive studies which support my own conclusions that we could not possibly gain an advantage by the initiative use (first use) of nuclear weapons to defend Europe against a conventional attack.

The first consideration is that, were we to use them except as a demonstration, we would have to use them in the number of tens and low hundreds. Attack on this scale would be required to stop, say, four nominal tank breakthroughs (a common assumption). The number of noncombatants killed would be very high. I have seen competent estimates which suggest that a median number killed might be a million people....

The danger of escalation after the first use of nuclear weapons I regard as being extremely high....

Finally it does not appear that relative advantage would accrue to NATO from a nuclear first use, because of the fact that we have a far more vulnerable target system, smaller numbers of highly critical targets like harbors, depots and airfields, and that the Soviets have a capability to attack these sorts of targets with nuclear weapons at least comparable to ours....

The problem of authorizing use is very severe. I personally do not believe that a President of the United States would be likely to release tactical nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack. It think he would see, and his advisers would tell him, that the risk of total destruction of Europe and the total destruction of the United States would be too high. So no commander would count on these weapons when push came to shove....

A Proposal for Achieving Zero Nuclear Weapons

By Admiral Noel Gayler, US Navy (Ret.)

It is conceded by all hands that we stand at some continuing risk of nuclear war. The risk is possibly not imminent, but it is basically important above all else — for survival. The Defense and Energy Departments together have made promising starts to reduce possession of nuclear weapons, but far more and much faster action is needed.

Credible report has it that weapons are adrift, potentially available to irresponsible regimes and to terrorists. Independent development by them is not needed to establish threat. The peculiar characteristic of nuclear weaponry is that relative numbers between adversaries mean little. When a target country can be destroyed by a dozen weapons, its own possession of thousands of weapons gains no security. Defense against ballistic missiles is infeasible. What is more, it is irrelevant. Half a dozen non-technical means of delivery are available, in addition to cruise missiles and aircraft.

The recognized and awful dangers of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological, do not compare to nuclear, despite their vileness. On the tremendous and incredible scale of killing, the others are retail as compared to the nuclear's wholesale; but there need not be competition since all can be — must be — addressed concurrently.

Drafting a successor to the nuclear arms treaty is purportedly underway. If START III repeats the mistakes of the past, it may well bog down into haggling over relative numbers. More productive can be a process continuing toward total nuclear disarmament, the only way in which both we and the world may be truly secure from nuclear destruction.

An irony is that in developing and using nuclear weapons, we, the United States, have done the only thing capable of threatening our own national security. We have comparatively weak and friendly neighbors to the north and south, control of the seas, and a powerful air and combat-tested armed forces. We are proof that this in no way diminishes the need, as the world's single greatest power, for Army, Navy, Air, and Marines capable not only of our own defense, but of intervention abroad in the interest of peace and human rights. These forces do not come into being overnight, but need to be continually developed and supported. The argument for a nuclear component is no longer valid. The time is now for a concrete proposal that meets the problem. Process, as opposed to negotiating numbers, is the basic principle of the proposal that I suggest. It is nothing less than drastic: the continuing reduction to zero of weapons in the hands of avowed nuclear powers, plus an end to the nuclear ambitions of others.

The proposal: Let weapons be delivered to a single point, there to be dismantled, the nuclear material returned to the donors for use or disposal, and the weapons destroyed.

This process, once underway, will be nearly impossible to stop, since its obvious merits, political and substantive, will compel support. The "single point" may well be a floating platform, at sea, in international waters. A handy platform can be an aircraft carrier that has been removed from "mothballs" and disarmed, yet capable of steaming to the desired location and operating support aircraft and ships to handle heavier loads. Living quarters for personnel, ships company, and disarmament processors, would be integral, as would be major protected spaces.

The US, of course, is the obvious source of a carrier, but there could be international manning, following the precedent of NATO. This would make the American ship politically palatable to the participants and Russia would be handled sensitively. Obvious and major advantages of security, inspection, availability, timing, and cost would ensue. Those regimes and groups not initially participating can be put under enormous pressure to join. Any remaining recalcitrant can be disarmed militarily, this

time with a concert of powers.

The need for persuasion and understanding of the participating powers is, of course, fundamental, and probably the most difficult requirement to meet. To meet this need of public understanding and consequent action, domestic and foreign, will require that we dispel some common illusions, such as:

- **Is physical defense against nuclear weapons possible? No.** What's more, it's irrelevant. A half dozen non-technical means of delivery avail.

- **Can nuclear weapons be used in any sensible manner? No.** This includes "tactical."

- **Does nuclear disarmament imperil our security? No.** It enhances it.

- **Is deterrence of nuclear or other attack by threat of retaliation still possible? No.** The many potential aggressors are scattered — even location unknown. No targets!

With these illusions dispelled, it becomes evident that nuclear disarmament works to the advantage of every power. Only in this way can the world be made safe from unprecedented murder and destruction. It remains to take the necessary actions. They are feasible and imperative.

Admiral Noel Gayler (US Navy, Ret.) is a four-star admiral and served as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). He was responsible for nuclear attack tactical development and demonstration of nuclear attack tactics to the Chairman and Joint Chiefs.

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/00.12/gayler-proposal_for_achieving_zero_nuclear_weapons.html

<http://www.cdi.org/issues/armscontrol/palme.htm>

<http://www.nuclearfiles.org/ethics/military/militaryonabolition.html>

Prepared Remarks to the Olof Palme International Center

**for Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan, USN (Ret.)
Director, Center for Defense Information
Stockholm, Sweden, 6 March 1997**

In 1948, as a junior officer in the U.S. Navy, I took part in *Operation Fitzwilliam*, a classified exercise to determine the effects of nuclear explosions on fully operational and fully manned warships. In 1949, I was involved in two additional nuclear tests in the Pacific.

Even with my personal experience with 3 major nuclear tests, it is difficult, yes, almost impossible to describe the awesome power, the devastation, the contamination, and the sheer horror and unlimited brutality of such a weapon. I knew then, but didn't realize it, what I know now, that nuclear weapons have no place in the weapons inventories of any nation and there must be an organized serious international effort to rid the world of this weapon of mass destruction. You now know why I signed the *Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals*, why I today support the work of the Canberra Commission and the position of General Butler and General Goodpaster on the ultimate goal of nuclear abolition, and why the Center for Defense Information has been calling for reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons for many years -- long before it became politically acceptable.

The goal must be the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with near- and mid-term reductions in all nuclear stockpiles. An increasing number of people are recognizing that nuclear weapons are not acceptable as instruments of war; that their only utility is to deter the use of a large number of nuclear weapons by other nations. Only four nations could launch such an attack on the United States today and two of them are among our closest allies -- Britain and France. The other two are Russia -- who receives U.S. aid to help them destroy many of those nuclear weapons -- and China -- who is armed with no more than 500 weapons, only a handful of which the Chinese could employ against the United States directly. We do not need to maintain a first strike posture to deter the use of nuclear weapons by these four countries, only a retaliatory force, and only for as long as any nation has significant numbers of nuclear weapons. Thus, if the United States worked together with the Russians, the Chinese, the British, and the French to reduce nuclear arsenals globally, with the ultimate aim of eliminating them, there would be no need for any of these nations to maintain a costly and dangerous nuclear deterrent.

All other threats to the United States can be met with conventional weapons. You don't need nuclear weapons to deter or retaliate against a nation armed with only a handful of nuclear weapons. After all, we have demonstrated that the United States can destroy targets with its vast array of powerful non-nuclear weapons. In the words of then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, nuclear weapons are "a wasted investment in a military capability

that is limited in political or military utility," and that the United States has "ways of responding and punishing conventionally" to attack, that nations "would not wish to see us use." [24 September 1993]

Non-nuclear weapons are also a more credible deterrent. To be credible, you must have demonstrated a willingness to use your weapons. In 52 years, we've used nuclear weapons twice. We've used non-nuclear weapons more times than you or I could count. In the words of then Commander of U.S. Space Command, General Charles Horner, "[Nuclear] deterrence doesn't work outside of the Russian-U.S. context." [15 July 1994] Nuclear weapons did not inhibit Argentina to fight a nuclear-armed Britain over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands. Nor did a single one of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal prove useful in deterring Saddam Hussein; nor in fighting wars in Korea or Vietnam; or in quelling unrest in Somalia or Bosnia.

My call for working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is based on realism not idealism. As a former fleet commander, it is clear to me that you can't fight a war using nuclear weapons. Yes, war is about killing people and destroying things and nothing does this more completely than nuclear weapons. The problem is, the indiscriminate and uncontrollable nature of nuclear weapons makes them unusable. Even though we faced military defeat in Vietnam, not one of our 30,000 nuclear weapons was used. The reason is simple: If you use nuclear weapons, you destroy everything that the war is about. You contaminate the very land over which you are fighting to control. You destroy the industry and wealth, you erase the history, you murder the innocents. Nobody wins if nuclear weapons are used.

While these facts are well recognized, the thinking in the Pentagon hasn't changed much. We continue to arm, train, and equip ourselves to fight a war using nuclear weapons. In 1997, the United States will spend some \$24 billion to maintain the capability to deliver some 7,000 strategic nuclear warheads anywhere in the world on minutes notice. Our land-based ICBMs, our bomber force, and our SLBM submarine fleet are ready -- but for what purpose? Where are the targets? Do we need deterrence a thousand times over? It is imperative that Pentagon planners and politicians recognize that the world has changed since 1989.

The eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is called for in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Working to fulfill this obligation will further our non-proliferation goal. In negotiating and signing the NPT Treaty more than 25 years ago, the non-nuclear weapons states made a bargain with the five nuclear weapons states. They gave up their right to nuclear weapons in exchange for access to the peaceful application of nuclear power and for positive steps toward disarmament by the nuclear weapons states. The nuclear weapons states recommitted themselves to this goal in the *Principles and Objectives Statement*, adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995. In this document, the nuclear weapons states reaffirmed their commitment to "the determined pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons...." If the nuclear weapons states do not act to live up to their end of the NPT bargain, we cannot and should not be surprised if non-nuclear weapons states reconsider their adherence to this valuable treaty. The entire non-proliferation regime could fall.

The United States and the other nuclear weapons states must recognize one simple

fact: we cannot forever maintain a world in which some nations possess nuclear weapons while others may not. The United States cannot continue to develop and produce improved nuclear delivery systems, to maintain the ability to fight a nuclear war, and to justify the use of nuclear weapons while at the same time expect nations whose security is threatened by our actions to eschew nuclear weapons forever. Instead of clinging to weapons to deter their use by others, we should be actively working to delegitimize nuclear weapons. The security interests of the United States would be better served by living up to its promise to work in concert with the other nuclear weapons states to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons.

My position and that of my fellow signatories to the Generals and Admirals letter is really not radical. It is, after all, the official policy of the United States government and has been since Truman was in the White House. Nevertheless, the reaction to our letter in the United States has been troubling. The journalists, the politicians, the policy analysts, and nuclear weapons hawks have largely missed our point, mostly by design. They have focused their criticism on our *ultimate* goal of eliminating nuclear weapons while ignoring our near term recommendations, the purpose of which is to reduce the dangers of accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.

Some believe we are advocating the unilateral elimination of nuclear weapons. While the U.S. could unilaterally *reduce* our nuclear stockpile further without harming U.S. security, *elimination* can and should only happen in conjunction with the other nuclear armed and nuclear capable states.

Many people have called our goal unrealistic. I guess they have forgotten what President Eisenhower said back in 1956:

"If men can develop weapons that are so terrifying as to make the thought of global war include almost a sentence for suicide, you would think that man's intelligence and his comprehension...would include also his ability to find a peaceful solution." [President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Press Conference, Washington, DC, 14 November 1956]

Nobody knew how to bring down the Berlin Wall, but that didn't deter us from reaching that goal. Nobody knew how to put a person on the moon, but that didn't stop President Kennedy from establishing that goal and it sure didn't stop the American space program from taking the baby steps necessary to make that giant leap a reality. While it's true that nobody knows exactly how to reach the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, we do know a variety of steps which will lead us in the right direction, that will help build the kind of world in which elimination is truly possible. The many steps have been laid out in the Generals and Admirals letter, in publications by the Center for Defense Information and other groups, and spelled out in greater detail in the Canberra Commission's Report.

Unfortunately, in the United States, the journey has been delayed because the destination has been called improbable by an influential and vocal opposition. This opposition has confused the issue by emphasizing what they characterize as the impractical goal of nuclear weapons abolition with what the supporters are after. That is the interim actions and regimes which will make the world a safer place today and which will be the foundation for a nuclear weapons free future.

Some have suggested to me and others that we should downplay or forget altogether our ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the planet in order to achieve our short term goals of de-alerting nuclear weapons, of reducing nuclear stockpiles further, of improving the safety and security of nuclear weapons and weapons materials. Perhaps that would help us accomplish some minor short-term goals, but we believe it would hinder future efforts aimed at not only deeper cuts in arsenals but also in increased openness and improved safeguards.

Additionally, only by remaining committed to zero will our greater non-proliferation goals be served. Regardless, it's not as if we're saying anything all that radical or new. Our goal is the same as that of all five declared nuclear weapons states -- "the determined pursuit...of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons...." [Principles and Objectives Statement, May 1995]

But, how committed is the United States to that goal. According to State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns, "successive administrations have committed themselves to" the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, "but, of course, we must live in the real world. We must live practically. We must prepare practically for the security of the American people and our allies around the world who are relying upon the United States to provide for their security." At that briefing Burns was asked by a reporter: "Q: Therefore, the Administration plans to keep some of its nuclear weapons indefinitely?" to which he responded a straightforward "Yes." [4 December 1996]

Many Americans today are unconcerned because they have forgotten or don't understand that nuclear weapons continue to endanger their lives and the future of the planet. For many of them, the threat posed by nuclear weapons disappeared when the Soviet Union crumbled and the Berlin Wall fell. Granted, the number of nuclear weapons worldwide has been reduced from a Cold War height of some 70,000 weapons, but there still exists some 40,000 nuclear weapons on the planet today; 97 percent of which are controlled by the United States and Russia. We've all heard that the START II Treaty will decrease U.S. and Russian arsenals to 3,500 nuclear weapons. That is grossly misleading. The START II Treaty merely limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia each plan to maintain some 10,000 deployed and stored, long- and short-range nuclear weapons. Assuming that the START II Treaty is ratified by the Russian Duma and fully implemented, by the year 2003, there will still exist about 23,000 nuclear weapons worldwide. There are no plans being formally discussed to further reduce these weapons. However, there is good reason to believe that certain agencies in the U.S. Administration are looking beyond START II. Hopefully, this will be on the agenda when President Clinton meets with President Yeltsin in Helsinki.

Still others have responded to the Generals and Admirals letter quite favorably. Some point to it as support for their own efforts to alter U.S. nuclear policy. The staff at CDI continues to work with many of the signers of the letter as well as with like-minded people on Capitol Hill. We also work with three coalitions who are dedicated to this important topic: the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, the Abolition 2000 caucus, and a newly-formed and influential Committee on Nuclear Policy. Many prominent Americans are identifying with this new and

important committee.

These groups are not alone in wanting real change in U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine. In October 1996, two months before the Generals and Admirals Statement, Congressman Floyd Spence (R-SC), chair of the House National Security Committee, released a committee report entitled The Clinton Administration and Stockpile Stewardship: Erosion by Design. The report is completely at odds with what we see as a mood swing just beginning in the United States. The report criticized the Administration for even the slightest arms control measures. For example, it claimed that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "is clearly threatening the nation's long-term ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile." The report also criticizes the Clinton Administration for the lack of concrete plans to resume the production of tritium, for the shrinking size of the nuclear weapons complex, and for the United States' inability to produce plutonium pits on a large scale. According to Congressman Spence, "In my mind, it's no longer a question of the Administration's benign neglect of our nation's nuclear forces, but instead, a compelling case can be made that it is a matter of erosion by design." [NSC Press Release, October 30, 1996] With political leaders like Spence fighting the Administration on every little arms control measure, those who favor reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and deeper cuts in the arsenals have a lot of work to do.

Proponents of nuclear abolition also must overcome the push for NATO expansion. Talk of expanding this military alliance which was formed to protect a weakened Western Europe from Soviet influence and invasion, has already hindered the Russian Duma's consideration of ratifying the START II Treaty. Moreover, it may jeopardize efforts aimed at deeper reductions. In October 1995, then-Senator Sam Nunn gave a moving speech warning about the dangers of NATO expansion:

"I recall very well when the United States and our allies felt we were overwhelmed with conventional forces by the former Soviet Union. How did we respond? We responded by building up tactical nuclear forces. We responded by deploying thousands of tactical nuclear forces because we did not have the artillery tubes to meet the conventional challenge. Are we confident the Russians would be so different from us if they truly have a nationalistic surge and end up believing the NATO enlargement is a threat to them? I am not confident that would not be their response as it was ours years ago. The security of NATO, Russia's neighbors and the countries of Eastern Europe will not be enhanced if the Russian military finger moves closer to the nuclear trigger."

The window of opportunity for deep reductions and a lessening of the nuclear threat would then be closed. In the words, again of Sam Nunn, "we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement that we ignore the consequences it may have for even more important security priorities."

Although the immediate response to the Generals and Admirals letter in the United States has been lukewarm, we must not allow this to dampen our efforts. Recall the words of President Eisenhower who said that:

"Controlled, universal disarmament is the imperative of our time. The demand for it by the hundreds of millions whose chief concern is the long future of themselves and their children will, I hope, become so universal and so insistent that no man, no government anywhere, can withstand it." [Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address to the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 10 December 1959]

Controlled, universal nuclear disarmament remains the imperative of our age. We have a unique opportunity and the window may not be open for long. For the first time in more than 45 years, the elimination of nuclear weapons seems like a distinct, if distant, possibility. Just as the longest journey begins with a single step, it is time for the nations of the world to begin this journey toward eliminating the nuclear threat for all time. And, as the nation which invented the nuclear weapon and as the only nation to have used it in war, the United States has the prime responsibility to lead the world forward, toward a world in which the mushroom cloud is only a nightmare of the past.

There are a number of unilateral steps that the United States could take to jump start the process.

- The United States could remove the warheads from all missiles and bombers to be eliminated under the START II Treaty. This would not jeopardize U.S. security. It would still leave the United States with 3,500 strategic warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, all ready for war.
- President Clinton could make U.S. command and control more transparent so as to improve confidence that the United States truly does not target Russia or any non-nuclear weapon state that is a signatory of the NPT Treaty.
- Furthermore, the United States could bring home the more than 400 U.S. Air Force tactical bombs currently deployed in Europe and cancel the subcritical nuclear tests that the Department of Energy plans to conduct at the Nevada Test Site.

While unilateral actions can get the denuclearization process moving, multilateral efforts are required to make the process work. Some of those multilateral efforts include:

- separating warheads from delivery systems;
- placing those warheads and missiles into safe, internationally-monitored storage;
- dismantling all tactical nuclear weapons;
- eliminating the thousands of strategic warheads that the United States and Russia plan to maintain in storage indefinitely;
- cutting further the deployed strategic arsenals of all five declared nuclear weapons states;
- banning the production of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for any purpose; and
- enforcing strict controls on all fissile materials worldwide.

We must work together to create a world in which it is possible for all nations

to agree not to develop, build, acquire, maintain, or use nuclear weapons. We will all be far safer in a world without nuclear weapons. For more information on the elimination of nuclear weapons, please contact [Chris Hellman](#)

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Admiral John J. Shanahan

John J. Shanahan enlisted in the U.S. Navy prior to the outbreak of World War II and retired in 1977 as a vice admiral. He was involved in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. He commanded the U.S. Second Fleet in the Atlantic. His shore assignments included staff member for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and director of strategic plans and policy in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

After his retirement Admiral Shanahan remained active in national security issues. For a number of years he was Director of the Center for Defense Information.

*In March 1997 Admiral Shanahan presented **Remarks to the Olof Palme International Center** [<http://www.cdi.org/issues/armscontrol/palme.htm>] in Stockholm, Sweden on the subject of nuclear abolition. He recalled his involvement as a junior officer in nuclear tests in the Pacific in 1948 and 1949. He indicated:*

I knew then, but didn't realize it, what I know now, that nuclear weapons have no place in the weapons inventories of any nation and there must be an organized serious international effort to rid the world of this weapon of mass destruction....

The goal must be the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with near- and mid-term reductions in all nuclear stockpiles.

In his remarks Admiral Shanahan mentioned several unilateral steps that the United States could take to jumpstart the process. They included:

- Remove the warheads from all missiles and bombers to be eliminated under the START II Treaty.
- Make U.S. command and control more transparent so as to improve confidence that the United States truly does not target Russia or any non-nuclear weapon state that is a signatory of the NPT Treaty.
- Bring home the more than 400 U.S. Air Force tactical bombs currently deployed in Europe and cancel the subcritical nuclear tests that the Department of Energy plans to conduct at the Nevada Test Site.

Admiral Shanahan also recommended multilateral efforts, including:

- Separating warheads from delivery systems;
- Placing those warheads and missiles into safe, internationally-monitored storage;
- Dismantling all tactical nuclear weapons;
- Eliminating the thousands of strategic warheads that the United States and Russia plan to maintain in storage indefinitely;
- Cutting further the deployed strategic arsenals of all five declared nuclear weapons states;

- Banning the production of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for any purpose;
- Enforcing strict controls on all fissile materials worldwide.

<http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/NuclearP08.html>

Statement of [Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN \(Ret.\)](#)

General Horner, General Johnson, I'm sure you both know the old saying that old generals never die, they just fade away. In the Navy, old Admirals never die they just keep on telling sea stories. A sea story is something you imagine happened in your past and you now tell with exaggeration. There is no way for me to tell with exaggeration this morning the dangers that nuclear weapons pose to each of us, to the world around us.

This morning somewhere there are over 30,000 nuclear warheads. The majority of those are in Russia and the United States and therefore it is those countries that must begin the rapid reduction of these weapons. Neither country is doing nearly enough in that direction. We are moving at about the pace of molasses flowing in the middle of winter. Witness two and half weeks ago the summit between President Putin and President Clinton in Moscow. It made absolutely no progress on this issue of reducing nuclear weapons.

We must go downward much more rapidly than we are if we are going to prevent the further proliferation of these weapons to other states as we've recently had proliferation to Pakistan and India. As long as the two nuclear superpowers maintain arsenals in the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, there is no way they can with any consistency urge that other nations not be allowed to acquire these weapons. We need a wide citizen protest over the unwillingness of our government to take more meaningful and dramatic steps to solve this problem of seminal importance to you, to me and to all mankind.

Interview Admiral Stansfield Turner

October 10, 1998

ADM's Steve Sapienza interviews Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Director of the CIA (1977-81),
for *Can We Learn to Live Without Nuclear Weapons?*

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MR. SAPIENZA: During the Cold War, obviously people were very concerned about the threat of nuclear war, but in the post Cold War era, it's -- it's somewhat fallen off the scope for a lot of Americans. Why -- why do you think that is -- why do you think that's happened?

Admiral STANSFIELD TURNER: There's a euphoria in our country today and that's good. It's good that we can pay attention to other problems like social problems and racial problems and economic problems of one sort and another. But, the nuclear problem has not gone away because the Cold War has ended. What the American public does not understand today is that there are thirty-seven thousand nuclear warheads out there in the world somewhere this afternoon. And that's just unacceptable in terms of our long term security. But I think we also do not understand is that during the Cold War, we were very worried about a holocaust between us and the Soviet Union. But the probability of that was pretty low because we understood it was suicidal to start a nuclear war with a country that was as heavily armed as the Soviet Union or they with us.

Today, though, the problem has changed and the India/Pakistan tests are an indicator that the world is moving towards the proliferation of these weapons to other countries. That could mean that while it wouldn't be a holocaust, it might be a small number of nuclear weapons, but the probability of their being used could be greater than it was during the Cold War. I would suggest that any use of even one nuclear weapon will change the whole complexion of world relations. If we go to bed at night not knowing which city might be incinerated tomorrow, it's a different kind of a life. If the threat of nuclear weapons on the use of nuclear weapons becomes a part of the relations between the nations of the world, we're going to be in a different situation. We don't want to be there. We don't want to leave that kind of a world for our children and grand children.

MR. SAPIENZA: Well, how can we reduce these dangers, then, if they are present?

Adm. TURNER: Well, we have to continue with the processes we've been using for fifty or, no, for thirty-some years, the treaty processes and we have a treaty on the books right now

that hasn't been ratified by either the Russian [Duma] or our Senate. And it's a good treaty but it's not nearly good enough. We've got to supplement. Treaties go very, very slowly. The American public does not understand that if this current treaty called Start Two is in fact enacted by the Duma and by the Senate, it will leave the United States with ten thousand nuclear warheads ten years from now. That's totally unacceptable.

I propose a process called Strategic Escrow which would supplement, complement, the Start process. Tomorrow morning, either Mr. Clinton or Mr. Yeltsin would take a thousand nuclear warheads, move them from their missiles, maybe a couple hundred miles away and put them in storage and let the other side put observers there to count what went in and if anything came out. We don't need a Treaty. You know what a missile warhead is. We count it as it goes in and we keep it there. Then, we go back and forth. We do a thousand. They do a thousand. They do a thousand. We do a thousand. In a matter of a very few years, we could be down to the hundreds where we'd have to bring in the British, French, Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians, Israelis and we then try to get the world to a position where there are zero nuclear warheads married to, mated to their delivery vehicles. Nobody's sitting there on hair trigger alert. They haven't destroyed them. We want that to happen in time. But we've got a big step in that direction. But most of all, we've told the world, "Look, there is a new norm out there. These weapons are not here to be used. They're only here to keep others from using them. We hope we'll be able to get rid of them someday, but in the meantime, we have this pile in escrow over here where nobody's tempted to use it quickly.

MR. SAPIENZA: What inspired this notion?

Adm. TURNER: I came to this idea of strategic escrow, I think, in large measure because of my experience in negotiating the Salt II Treaty in the 1978 time frame during the Carter Administration. I was responsible as Director of Central Intelligence, for advising the Senate and the President on how well we could check on that treaty if we enacted it, how well we could know if the Soviet Union were cheating. I found myself having to tell the Senate that we could check on them by a hundred warheads. If they cheated by that much, we would know it. This was at a time when the Soviets had forty thousand warheads, a hundred made no difference. But, because it was a treaty, we had to go through that.

I recently wrote a book called Caging the Nuclear Genie in which I tried to formulate why we got where we got to which was thirty-two thousand nuclear warheads in the United States alone, and a doctrine that we would use these any time we felt like it, a doctrine that makes it hard for us to tell other countries of the world, "You shouldn't have them." It invites proliferation of them. And therefore, I was looking for a way to get those numbers down, to get that first use doctrine eliminated, but that didn't require a treaty that was going to take forever because we have an urgent problem now in the post Cold War world. If there's proliferation, once it starts it cascades.

If the Iraqis did get a nuclear weapon -- and they were close in 1991 when we went into their country by force -- the Iranians have to have one. If they both have one, the Saudi Arabians are going to want one and on it goes. So, I think there's an urgency here. And originally, I came up with the idea that we would just destroy a thousand warheads and then invite the Russians to do the same. It really is a perfectly good plan because we have so many more than we need right now that if we did a thousand and the Russians didn't come along, we certainly wouldn't be in any problem whatsoever. We've still got fifteen thousand of them in our arsenals, so that's not a problem. But I realized it was politically very difficult to sell unilateral disarmament. I, then, curiously asked myself if we did try to destroy a thousand nuclear warheads tomorrow, what would actually happen? Well, those warheads would all be shipped to a place called Pantex, Texas, where we disassemble nuclear warheads. And they would sit in a line down there behind several thousand warheads that are already waiting to be destroyed under other provisions. And therefore, we wouldn't really be destroying them, we would only be putting them in escrow.

So, this idea of escrow arose from the fact that it is the only practical thing we can do today unless we build another couple of Pantexes which we're not very likely to do. And so, it was

an effort to supplement, to complement the very slow treaty process that brought me to strategic escrow.

STEVE SAPIENZA: Now, this concept of strategic escrow, you mentioned, relies on having, you know, basically keeping tabs on what the other guys doing. This, you know, will be observers, obviously intelligence plays a role here. How important is intelligence in the -- in the -- in the post Cold War era looking at -- or in preventing proliferation and also aiding in these arms control reduction treaties. It seemed to get a little bit of a black eye -- intelligence got a bit of a black eye with the recent India/Pakistan tests. But, you know, do you think it's still -- plays a main role -- a big role.

Admiral STANSFIELD TURNER: Intelligence will be very important in making any kind of move towards lesser nuclear weapons. There's going to be a residual fear in all countries that somebody's cheating and somebody's going to get an advantage. It happens to be my thesis that until you get to very, very low numbers, there isn't any great danger of cheating, particularly because the United States will keep a couple of submarines out there until the very last. And they are virtually invulnerable and therefore will always be able to retaliate with an overwhelming force no matter what.

When you get down to the last hundred or fifty or twenty, yes, you're going to have to have a lot of caution to make people comfortable and that's where intelligence will be very important, but that's only one part of it. But I don't really worry about that last hundred at this point. We're so far from it that if through strategic escrow we could get the world down to where everybody had a hundred warheads left and all the rest were in escrow, we'd be so much better off than today and then we could grapple with that last hundred in a way that would make us feel comfortable.

STEVE SAPIENZA: You mentioned three, uh, three issues or three thesis, doctrine that we need to overcome a way of thinking in the military, in the command structure. What are -- briefly, what are those three things and why do we need to overcome them?

Admiral STANSFIELD TURNER: Well, both civilians and military people have followed three erroneous theorems about nuclear weapons now for some fifty years. The first is it's important to have about the same number as anybody else. This is true with tanks and aircraft and battleships or whatever in many cases. It's not true with nuclear weapons because after you've used a certain number -- and you can pick a number -- the usefulness just drops off. What more can you destroy? So, we've got to rid ourselves of that frightful concern that we might be 10 percent or 20 percent less than the Russians. Secondly, we've had a doctrine since 1952 that the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons first if we thought it in our national interest to do so.

We pledged this to our European allies in NATO that we would use nuclear weapons to defend them if we were losing a conventional war in Europe. That's a loser. And no president's used nuclear weapons in fifty-three years even though we lost in Vietnam. And in my opinion, no president will. If you read what President Kennedy said in the Cuban Missile Crisis, he backed away right smartly. If you read what Colin Powell wrote in his memoir about looking at nuclear weapons as a tactical device in the Gulf War, he said, it unnerved him. So, we ought to get that out of our system. It's a loser because the chances of getting some form of retaliation -- nuclear, biological, chemical, terrorism, if you use a nuclear weapon, is too great. And our country will not do something as disproportionate as a nuclear weapon against some Third World country that has done something that offends us would be.

The third false theorem is that maybe we would be vulnerable to a surprise attack in which all of our nuclear weapons would be eliminated by Russia overnight. It's absolutely insane. First of all we have those submarines out there at sea and the Russians don't know where they are, so there's no way they can eliminate them. But even if they could, in warfare, nothing goes perfectly. And therefore, even if they launched a massive attack on us, they wouldn't knock out everything. We would still have enough to devastate their country and that will deter them from starting such a war.

There's a residual feeling that you do have to have numbers of these weapons to be safe. And that's just not true. It's been grossly exaggerated. A few of them is enough to keep anybody from attacking you. The Russians don't want to lose Moscow and St. Petersburg and three or four other cities in order to try to accomplish something by attacking us. There's also a resistance that comes from a feeling that we have a haymaker in our hip pocket here that could get us out of some kind of trouble. Maybe it's because we're losing a war. Well, we lost in Vietnam. Well, maybe this is what we want to have as a last resort. We haven't been able to use it as a last resort. It isn't that kind of a weapon. And therefore, we don't need to worry about having this -- this form of last resort.

MR. SAPIENZA: You, you know, coming up with the strategic escrow idea -- also talking earlier where you said just take -- back in the seventies where you said why don't we just take a thousand and just make the first move, get rid of them -- why do you feel so strongly that the United States should be the first -- should be the country to take the first step?

Adm. TURNER: No. I would like to clarify. I don't think the United States has to be the first country. In fact, I think it would be preferable if Russia would do it because it's a kind of a dramatic thing Mr. Yeltsin might want to do and secondly, he has more authority as a president than does President Clinton. I mean, we're more hamstrung in our democracy than they are in their incipient Democracy. And therefore, it would be easier for him to call up his strategic commander tomorrow morning and say, take a thousand and move them. President Clinton would have complaints from the Senate and so on that he'd have to grapple with, so either one could do it. Very frankly, I think the way to do it is you talk to MR. Yeltsin behind the scenes and say, "If I do it first, will you follow immediately?" and vice versa so that neither one gets out in -- in front.

MR. SAPIENZA: What are two -- this is the last question -- what are two or three immediate, concrete steps that the U.S. could take to lead the rest of the world toward the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons.

Adm. TURNER: The two most important steps are just start a strategic escrow process and we could do that by putting some weapons in storage away from their delivery vehicles. The second is to simply make a declaration that we will never be the first to use these. That doesn't eliminate our using them if somebody attacks us or our allies or friends around the world with nuclear weapons, but it does say, "We understand that these are not a proportionate kind of response to the sorts of problems that we're likely to have with conventional weapons."

MR. SAPIENZA: I just want to follow up on that. What about people who say, "Let's assume we started taking down our nuclear arsenal, brought it down to a very low level? What do you say to people who might suggest that -- that might invite conventional warfare or instability in different places around the world?"

Adm. TURNER: One cannot gainsay the argument that the existence of nuclear weapons may have prevented the super powers from engaging in conventional war during the Cold War -- can't prove that it did, but it's a possibility. But it's too dangerous a way to try to prevent conventional war today. There's just too much risk involved in keeping these weapons for that purpose.

And I believe that particularly now in this post-Cold War world, the United States has such a dominance of conventional military power, that we have some window of opportunity here. Call it ten years but I think it's more like twenty years before there's going to be a major conventional opponent, and let's use that window. Let's try during that time, to see if we can get these nuclear weapons safely onto the sidelines and yet maintain our basic national security with conventional force. And I think we can do that and I think we miss a tremendous opportunity for the United States but more for all human kind if we don't attempt to do that.

MR. SAPIENZA: All right. Great, Admiral.

Adm. TURNER: Thank you.

I propose a process called Strategic Escrow which would supplement, complement, the Start process. Tomorrow morning, either Mr. Clinton or Mr. Yeltsin would take a thousand nuclear warheads, move them from their missiles, maybe a couple hundred miles away and put them in storage and let the other side put observers there to count what went in and if anything came out. We don't need a Treaty. You know what a missile warhead is. We count it as it goes in and we keep it there. Then, we go back and forth. We do a thousand. They do a thousand. They do a thousand. We do a thousand. In a matter of a very few years, we could be down to the hundreds where we'd have to bring in the British, French, Chinese, Pakistanis, Indians, Israelis and we then try to get the world to a position where there are zero nuclear warheads married to, mated to their delivery vehicles. Nobody's sitting there on hair trigger alert. They haven't destroyed them. We want that to happen in time. But we've got a big step in that direction. But most of all, we've told the world, "Look, there is a new norm out there. These weapons are not here to be used. They're only here to keep others from using them. We hope we'll be able to get rid of them someday, but in the meantime, we have this pile in escrow over here where nobody's tempted to use it quickly.

<http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/NuclearP08.html>

Statement of [Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN \(Ret.\)](#)

General Horner, General Johnson, I'm sure you both know the old saying that old generals never die, they just fade away. In the Navy, old Admirals never die they just keep on telling sea stories. A sea story is something you imagine happened in your past and you now tell with exaggeration. There is no way for me to tell with exaggeration this morning the dangers that nuclear weapons pose to each of us, to the world around us.

This morning somewhere there are over 30,000 nuclear warheads. The majority of those are in Russia and the United States and therefore it is those countries that must begin the rapid reduction of these weapons. Neither country is doing nearly enough in that direction. We are moving at about the pace of molasses flowing in the middle of winter. Witness two and half weeks ago the summit between President Putin and President Clinton in Moscow. It made absolutely no progress on this issue of reducing nuclear weapons.

We must go downward much more rapidly than we are if we are going to prevent the further proliferation of these weapons to other states as we've recently had proliferation to Pakistan and India. As long as the two nuclear superpowers maintain arsenals in the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, there is no way they can with any consistency urge that other nations not be allowed to acquire these weapons. We need a wide citizen protest over the unwillingness of our government to take more meaningful and dramatic steps to solve this problem of seminal importance to you, to me and to all mankind.

[Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN \(Ret.\)](#) is the former Director of Central Intelligence (1977-81). He served as commander of a carrier task group of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (1970-71), commander of the United States Second Fleet in the Atlantic (1974-75) and commander-in-chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, NATO (1975-77). Admiral Turner was also John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point (1989-90). In recognition of his contributions to national security, President Jimmy Carter presented him with the National Security Medal in 1981.

After serving as commander of a carrier task group of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (1970-71), commander of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic (1974-75), and commander-in-chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, NATO (1975), Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.) was Director of Central Intelligence.

In 1997 Admiral Turner offered his ideas on nuclear weapons in a book entitled *Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security* (Westview Press). He wrote that it was time to move away from the Cold War policy of "sitting on hair trigger alert with thousands of nuclear warheads" (p.99). He offered "a new vision based on strategic escrow, a Treaty of No First-Use supplemented with sanctions, and modest defenses" (p.102).

Admiral Turner explained his idea of strategic escrow in a 1999 interview [<http://www.cdi.org/adm/1316/stansfield.html>].

It's a process I call strategic escrow. It's a form of de-alerting both the Russian and American nuclear forces. You take a thousand warheads off of missiles in the United

States today and you move them maybe 300 miles away, so they can't just go back overnight. You ask the Russians to put observers on that storage site where you've put the thousand warheads. They can count what went in, they can count if anything went out.

You don't need detailed verification procedures that take years to negotiate in a treaty. What you hope is the Russians then take a thousand off and put our observers on them. A lot of people think they will not, but I say they have to. It's the only quick way to avoid their having one-fourth to one-sixth the number of warheads on line that we have maybe eight or ten years from now, because of the decline inexorably of the size of their force due to the lack of maintenance.

So then we have a process going. We do another thousand, they do another thousand. I mean from today's numbers, we can be down into hundreds in a matter of, in my opinion, four or five years if we do this. And the most urgent thing for the United States today is to get the Russian nuclear arsenal off alert, get it down to as few of these as possible.

And my ultimate objective is to get every nuclear warhead in the world in escrow so nobody can pull the trigger today, but if somebody cheats, like Saddam Hussein, and decides to threaten the world because he's got the nuclear weapons that he shouldn't, then you still have the warheads in escrow and you can bring them back and say, "Saddam, you've got ten, but we just have recombined a hundred, and therefore you have no advantage. In fact, you're very vulnerable if you decide to continue threatening or using nuclear weapons."

When Admiral Turner joined military and religious leaders in the release of the Joint Statement on Nuclear Reductions/Disarmament at the Washington National Cathedral, he said in his own statement [<http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/NuclearP08.html>]:

We must go downward much more rapidly than we are if we are going to prevent the further proliferation of these weapons to other states as we've recently had proliferation to Pakistan and India. As long as the two nuclear superpowers maintain arsenals in the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, there is no way they can with any consistency urge that other nations not be allowed to acquire these weapons.

http://www.rc.net/hartford/st_joseph/deacon/nucleararms.html

St. Joseph Church

Bristol, Connecticut

Deacon Robert M. Pallotti, D. Min.

Pastoral Minister

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Atlantic Council, Further Reins On Nuclear Arms (August 1993).

Proposes three phases: bilateral, multilateral, and "zero level," and explores the corresponding pre-conditions for complete disarmament.

ACTIONS FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT US and Russia reduce to 1500-2000 Total warheads each.

Five declared NWSs adopt NFU policies.

Threefold nuclear states:

- Resolve nuclear issues between Israel and Pakistan
- Create NWF-zone in South Asia.

Reinforcing measures:

- Efforts to build and maintain highly capable detection mechanisms.
- Assess adequacy of interim level of 200 for all NWSs.
- Mideast peace efforts, and Israeli commitment to 200 warhead level.
- Agreement on positive security assurances.
- Discussions of response mechanisms for violations.
- Discussions of cut-off of fissile material production for military purposes.
- Discussion of CTB.
- Study of desirability/feasibility of global ban on intermediate and long-range land-based ICBMs.

Start Ratification

Denuclearization agreement between Russia and Ukraine

Russian progress toward democratization, internal stability, non-confrontational foreign policy.

ACTIONS FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Five declared NWSs reduce

Stockpiles to 100-200 each

- Cooperative security environment among industrialized democracies including Japan and Germany.
- Continued Russian progress toward democracy, internal stability
- Adoption on NFU by 5 declared nuclear powers.
- Strengthened non-proliferation regime.
- Agreement to reassess and halt reductions if "rogue" is detected to have built or be near to building nuclear weapons.
- Agreement by Israel, India, Pakistan to a level not exceeding 200, and commitment that nuclear weapons are "defensive last resort".
- Acceptance of START Verification procedures

ACTIONS FEATURES OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Abolish and eliminate all nuclear

weapons.

- High-confidence in procedural safeguards and response capabilities against proliferation.
- Additional NWF zones.
- Monitored ban on fissile material
- Ban on nuclear testing.
- Elimination of land-based ballistic missiles.
- Tactical ballistic missile defense as safeguard against breakout/cheating.

- Rigoursly enforced nonproliferation regime.

Opening Remarks to General Butler's Abolition Speech

General Andrew J. Goodpaster

National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

December 4, 1996

I welcome the opportunity to talk with you about the reduction of the world's nuclear weapons arsenals. It is an issue that ranks in the highest order of importance for American security (and that of others) in the coming century.

To do what needs to be done means giving high priority to the issue and sustained commitment to the efforts amidst a vast number of other demands. This will not be easy. Nor can it be taken for granted, whatever the merits of the case, in a security process where the more urgent is in constant battle with the more important (and quite regularly wins). It will take firm top-level decision and determined follow-up leadership over many years to move the needed nuclear policies and action forward.

But it can and must be done. Two considerations fundamental to security interests and possibilities should now shape the nuclear future.

First, as so often emphasized by President Eisenhower (who had a talent for getting to the heart of such questions) nuclear weapons are the only thing that can destroy the United States of America.

Second, the Cold War is over and unlikely to return, hard as it may be to comprehend this historic fact in all its dimensions, and to seize the opportunities that are now available to reorient our policies accordingly.

Nowhere is this more salient than in reducing the world's arsenals of nuclear weapons.

<http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/goodpasterremark.html>

<http://prop1.org/2000/gengbio.htm>

General Colin Powell

[photo] *General Colin Powell, U.S. Army (ret.) entered the Army through the ROTC. He had two tours of duty in Vietnam and served as a battalion commander in Korea. He held a succession of military and civilian positions, culminating as National Security Adviser to President Reagan. In 1989 President George H.W. Bush appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position he held until the fall of 1993 under President Clinton. He now serves as Secretary of State under President George W. Bush.*

*In a commencement address at Harvard University on June 10, 1993 General Powell spoke on **the future of nuclear weapons**.*

Today -- on what happens to be the 30th anniversary of the talks that led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- I declare my hope and declare it from the bottom of my heart that we will eventually see the time when the number of nuclear weapons is down to zero and the world is a much better place.

*Three months later General Powell articulated his views on **the utility of nuclear weapons** in a breakfast meeting with the Defense Writers' Group, held on September 23, 1993.*

- With respect to nuclear weapons, I think their principal purpose remains deterrence against a major nuclear attack against the United States, however remote that might be, and thank God it's becoming more and more and more remote.
- The second part of that, though, has to do with the fact that there are a number of nations in the Third World who think that they will gain some political or military utility through the possession of nuclear weapons. Every time I get a chance to talk to them, I try to dissuade them of that. And I make the point that I think that it's a wasted investment in a military capability that is limited in political or military utility, and that we have ways of responding and punishing conventionally that you would not wish to see us use. And at the end of the day, we have far more nuclear weapons than you do, so what's the utility that you get out of this?
- I have not been faced with a military situation in the several conflicts we've been involved in over the last four years where I thought there was going to be a need to resort to such weapons, and I'm glad that turned out to be the case. We've had two wars [in Panama and the Persian Gulf], six rescues and 22 other major events in the last four years for these reluctant warriors in the Pentagon.

*In 2001 General Colin Powell, now retired from the U.S. Army, became secretary of state in the administration of President George W. Bush. He discussed the **prospects for use of nuclear weapons** in an interview on the News Hour with Jim Lehrer on May 30, 2002. The focus was the threat of war between India and Pakistan. Lehrer asked him, "If there is, in fact, a conflict, how likely is it that it would eventually lead to the use of nuclear weapons by these two countries?" Powell replied:*

I can't answer that question, but I can say this: In my conversations with both sides, especially with the Pakistani side, I have made it clear that this really can't be in anyone's

mind. I mean, the thought of nuclear conflict in the year 2002 -- with what that would mean with respect to loss of life, what that would mean with respect to the condemnation, the worldwide condemnation that would come down on whatever nation chose to take that course of action -- would be such that I can see very little military, political, or any other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age, seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating.

General Andrew J. Goodpaster

<http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/biogoodpaster.htm>
photo

Shaping the Nuclear Future: Toward a More Comprehensive Approach
<http://www.acus.org/Publications/occasionalpapers/internationalsecurity/ShapingNuclearFuture.pdf>

Atlantic Council

Program on International Security

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Assistant Director Jason S. Purcell jpurcell@acus.org

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<http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/NuclearP03.html>

Statement of [General Charles A. Horner, USAF \(Ret.\)](#)

The Statement concerning nuclear weapons is in response to the recent changes in the world. The Gulf War of 1991 was the first that included military operations in an effort to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to include nuclear devices. Since then we have seen continued efforts by others to build and maintain nuclear weapons. The Cold War is over. The United States and Russia no longer require the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Yet the world remains a dangerous place.

The Statement recognizes these changes and the need for new strategies that cope with the post-Cold War world and seek betterment for all. It addresses the fact that nuclear deterrence increasingly lacks credibility, and if these weapons are retained for such purposes, it may only legitimize their use. It is hopeful, but not overly optimistic, as it calls for reciprocal and phased reductions that may require many years. It is a challenge, for while the banning of nuclear weapons is not the sole responsibility of the United States, we are in a position to lead the effort. We can choose to do nothing and accept our fate, or we can seek solutions to the threat posed by our own and others' arsenals of nuclear weapons. This issue is one confronting our vital national interests from a security and moral point of view. It is one requiring the involvement of both Military Professionals and Religious Leaders.

Jonathan Schell, in writing "The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons" (special issue of The Nation, February 1998), asked General Horner what first led him to reflect on the nuclear question. The general replied:

When I was a young guy, a lieutenant in the Air Force stationed in England, I'd go out and sit alert with nuclear weapons. I didn't like it. It was the cold war -- the idea was: Defeat the Russian horde coming through Germany by putting nuclear weapons down. I understood the deterrent aspect of it. Certainly that seemed reasonable, given how the world was at the time. On the other hand, if I'd actually had to execute, it seemed most unreasonable. The targeting didn't make a hell of lot of sense. So to the practical person, it seemed like a very unfortunate situation to be in. I never wondered whether I'd execute or not, because, quite frankly, I never believed they would be launched.

The other thing that occurred to me was the lack of military utility of nuclear weapons. In the Gulf War, we took inordinate measures to preclude unnecessary casualties. Nuclear weapons are such a *gross* instrument of power that they really have no utility. They work against you, in that they are best used to destroy cities, and kill women and children. Now first, that's morally wrong; it doesn't make sense; and then, of course, there is the threat that nuclear weapons in the hands of irresponsible or desperate powers. If *you* own them, you legitimize them just by your own ownership.

General Lee Butler Addresses the State of the World Forum

General Lee Butler Addresses the State of the World Forum **General George Lee Butler**,
USAF (Ret.) San Francisco, CA October 3, 1996 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I must
say at the outset that this is a singular moment in my life ...
<http://www.gs institute.org/archives/000008.shtml>

An Address by **General Lee Butler** To The National Press Club Washington, D.C. February 2,
1998 Thank you, and good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Dorene and I are honored by your
presence and gratified by your welcome. Although we ...
<http://www.gs institute.org/archives/000023.shtml>

Here is a quote from Powell on the news Hour show of last Thursday, May 30th--the interview centered on the possibility of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan--the following Powell quote (particularly the second paragraph) may be useful in the fight against Bunker Buster:

JIM LEHRER: If there is, in fact, a conflict, how likely is it that it would eventually lead to the use of nuclear weapons by these two countries?

COLIN POWELL: I can't answer that question, but I can say this: In my conversations with both sides, especially with the Pakistani side, I have made it clear that this really can't be in anyone's mind, I mean, the thought of nuclear conflict in the year 2002 - with what that would mean with respect to loss of life, what that would mean with respect to the condemnation, the worldwide condemnation that would come down on whatever nation chose to take that course of action would be such that

I can see very little military, political, or any other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age, seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating.

Great Seal of the United States web sites

<http://www.greatseal.com/>

<http://www.baldeagleinfo.com/eagle/eagle9.html>

President and Mrs. Carter: The Larry King Live Interview Transcript 19 Nov 2002

CNN LARRY KING LIVE

Interview With Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter

The following is a transcript of President and Mrs. Carter's taped interview with Larry King, broadcast Nov. 15 on CNN's Larry King Live show.

KING: Mr. President, do you fear actual biological, chemical kind of attacks in this country?

PRESIDENT CARTER: I don't have any fear of it. I know there's always a possibility. One of the things that the United States government has not done is to try to comply with and enforce international efforts targeted to prohibit the arsenals of biological weapons that we ourselves have and others have, and also to reduce and enforce the agreement to eliminate chemical weapons. And the same way with nuclear weapons. The major powers need to set an example, Larry, where we're willing to comply with international standards in reduction. This applies to land mines and the proliferation of new kinds of nuclear weapons and the canceling of existing nuclear agreements. I think quite often the big countries that are responsible for the peace of the world set a very poor example for those who might hunger for the esteem or the power or the threats that they can develop from nuclear weapons themselves. I don't have any doubt that it's that kind of atmosphere that has led to the nuclearization, you might say, of India and Pakistan. And I think we, ourselves, and the British and the French and the Russians and the Chinese, have to be willing to make some sacrifice on our own part in order to convince the rest of the world this is a right way to go.

<http://www.cartercenter.org/viewdoc.asp?docID=1108&submenu=news>

Additions and corrections to Military Leaders Speak Out

1. At index at top: Individual Views
 - a. Add: General Andrew J. Goodpaster [link to below]
 - b. For alphabetical order, put Admiral Shanahan ahead of Admiral Turner; same for text section below
2. At sub-index for Individual Views:
 - a. Correct spelling for General Horner (an "r" is missing)
 - b. Add in alphabetical order:
 - Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.
 - General Andrew J. Goodpaster
 - Admiral John J. Shanahan
 - Admiral Stansfield Turner
 - c. Provide linkage for all nine with their statements below
3. Add photos:
 - a. Admiral Carroll from <http://www.cnduk.org/campaigns/eugene.htm>
 - b. Admiral Turner from <http://www.washspkrs.com/speaker.cfm?speakerID=520>
4. For Admiral Gayler, add the following text after the first paragraph. It should be indented in block style in non-italic.

Let me begin by stating my main proposition plainly, so that there may be no misunderstanding. It is my view that there is no sensible military use for nuclear weapons, whether "strategic" weapons, "tactical" weapons, "theater" weapons, weapons at sea or weapons in space. . . .

Taking the Pacific first, when I was Commander-in-Chief (Pacific) I could not find, in scrutinizing the whole of the Pacific command, any area where it would conceivably have made sense to explode nuclear weapons in order to carry our military objectives. Clearly our experience in the Vietnam War suggests that we would not do such a thing. We did not do even "conventional" things which were well within our capability because of understandable political and humane considerations.

Nor could I see a case for nuclear weapons anywhere else on the Asian continent. For example, the Korean Demilitarized Zone is one flashpoint that comes immediately to mind. My evaluation, together with that of senior generals, both Korean and American, responsible for the defense of the Demilitarized Zone and of the city of Seoul and its approach and environs, was that it simply was not necessary to contemplate a nuclear strategy. The potential channels of attack on Seoul are highly concentrated, the defenses are well in place, and Seoul itself is protected by a river in front of it. . . .

Furthermore, with respect to the Asian continent as a whole, we have to face the fact that there is a political consideration of overwhelming importance. The only use of nuclear weapons has been against an Asiatic people. . . . [It] is my belief that the use of a nuclear weapon against any Asian people, for any purpose whatsoever, would polarize Asia

against us. It would clearly not be worth the candle. For all these reasons I saw no need for nuclear weapons in the Pacific theater, and I so stated.

Another potential theater, of course, is maritime Russia: the Soviet naval forces dispersed through the Pacific area, their bases, lines of transit, choke points. All I would say about that is that, while it is an important place, it is less important than the entire problem that would be involved if you were actually to fight Russia. . . .

In the Middle East, there have been various scenarios proposed, including the initiative use of nuclear weapons to block certain passes down into Iran and so forth. Pacific Command did a considerable study of that potentiality and came to the conclusion that we were so outgunned by the Soviets in nuclear delivery capabilities and in respect to the small number of highly critical targets we owned, compared with the very large number of less critical targets that they had, that it was not something that we should open up, on strictly military grounds.

I am now going to turn. . . .to NATO. I have seen some pretty persuasive studies which support my own conclusions that we could not possibly gain an advantage by the initiative use (first use) of nuclear weapons to defend Europe against a conventional attack.

The first consideration is that, were we to use them except as a demonstration, we would have to use them in the number of tens and low hundreds. Attack on this scale would be required to stop, say, four nominal tank breakthroughs (a common assumption). The number of noncombatants killed would be very high. I have seen competent estimates which suggest that a median number killed might be a million people. . . .

The danger of escalation after the first use of nuclear weapons I regard as being extremely high . . .

Finally it does not appear that relative advantage would accrue to NATO from a nuclear first use, because of the fact that we have a far more vulnerable target system, smaller numbers of highly critical targets like harbors, depots and airfields, and that the Soviets have a capability to attack these sorts of targets with nuclear weapons at least comparable to ours. . . .

The problem of authorizing use is very severe. I personally do not believe that a President of the United States would be likely to release tactical nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack. It think he would see, and his advisers would tell him, that the risk of total destruction of Europe and the total destruction of the United States would be too high. So no commander would count on these weapons when push came to shove. . . .

5. Add a new section in alphabetical order for General Goodpaster.

[begin box]

General Andrew J. Goodpaster

[photo from <http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/biogoodpaster.htm>]

[You may want to substitute this photo for the one you have with General Butler near the top of the page.]

A graduate from the U.S. Military Academy, General Andrew J. Goodpaster commanded a combat battalion in North Africa and Italy during World War II. He was staff secretary to President Eisenhower from 1954 to 1961. He served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (1969-1974). After retirement he was recalled to active duty as superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy. General Goodpaster served as chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States from 1985 to 1997 and now chairs its project on nuclear arms control.

*At the release of the Statement by International Generals and Admirals [<http://www.gs institute.org/archives/000014.shtml>] in December 1996, General Goodpaster offered opening remarks. [<http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/goodpasterremark.html>] *Among other things he said:**

I welcome the opportunity to talk with you about the reduction of the world's nuclear weapons arsenals. It is an issue that ranks in the highest order of importance for American security (and that of others) in the coming century. . . .

Two considerations fundamental to security interests and possibilities should now shape the nuclear future.

First, as so often emphasized by President Eisenhower (who had a talent for getting to the heart of such questions) nuclear weapons are the only thing that can destroy the United States of America.

Second, the Cold War is over and unlikely to return, hard as it may be to comprehend this historic fact in all its dimensions, and to seize the opportunities that are now available to reorient our policies accordingly.

Nowhere is this more salient than in reducing the world's arsenals of nuclear weapons.

To put his concerns into action General Goodpaster since 1991 has chaired the Nuclear Arms Control Project of the Atlantic Council of the United States. In this capacity he wrote three policy papers, which are reviewed in the Deep Cuts section [[linkage to be added](#)] in the How to Get to Zero page. He was also chair of a study group of the Stimson Center that produced a report on Evolving U.S. Nuclear Policy. [[linkage to be added](#)] In these efforts he developed ideas on stages of nuclear arms reduction.

[end of box]

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<http://www.fourthfreedom.org/php/t-d-index.php?hinc=turner.hinc>

Admiral Turner Appeals for Denuclearization through "Nuclear Escrow"

<http://www.abolition2000.org/military.html>

Military Leaders on Nuclear Weapons Abolition

- [Twelve pages of quotations by military and political leaders warning of uncontrollable nuclear escalation](#) contains more information.
- [Generals Speak Out on Eliminating Nuclear Weapons](#) (provided by the Stimson Center).

MILITARY LEADERS SPEAK OUT FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Statements

International Generals and Admirals
General Andrew J. Goodpaster and General Lee Butler

Individual Views

General Lee Butler
Admiral Noel Gayler
Commander Robert Green
General Charles Horner
General Collin Powell

Statements

International Generals and Admirals Speak Out

[photo of Senator Cranston at release of statement] *On December 5, 1996 there was worldwide release of a **Statement by International Generals and Admirals** [<http://www.gs institute.org/archives/000014.shtml>] calling for **the irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons**. Initiated by the late Senator Alan Cranston of the Global Security Institute [www.gs institute.org], the statement was signed by 60 military leaders from around the globe, including from the United States, Russia, 6 United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, India, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. They stated:*

It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now.

- First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;
- Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapon states and in de facto nuclear weapon states;
- Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

Their closing words were:

- We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

- The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and a new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity.

Statement by General Andrew J. Goodpaster and General Lee Butler

[photo of the two generals] *On December 4, 1996 at a Newsmaker Luncheon at the National Press Club, General Andrew J. Goodpaster and General Lee Butler released a **Joint Statement on Reduction of Nuclear Weapons Arsenals: Declining Utility, Continuing Risks** [<http://www.gs institute.org/archives/000009.shtml>]. General Goodpaster was former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (1969-74). General Butler was former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S Strategic Command and its predecessor, the Strategic Air Command (1992-94). Among other things they said:*

- With the end of the Cold War, [nuclear] weapons are of sharply reduced utility, and there is much now to be gained by substantially reducing their numbers and lowering their alert status, meanwhile exploring the feasibility of their ultimate elimination.
- The ultimate objective of phased reductions should be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from all nations. No one can say today whether or when this final goal will prove feasible....We believe that the time for action is now, for the alternative of inaction could very well carry a high price.

Individual Views

General Lee Butler

[photo] *A graduate of the U. S. Air Force Academy, General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (ret.), served in Vietnam, commanded a heavy bomber wing, and filled a variety positions at the Pentagon. In 1991 he became the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command and its successor agency, the U.S. Strategic Command until his retirement in 1994.*

After his retirement General Butler served as member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. His first public expression of his views on this issue occurred in October 1996 in an Address to the State of the World Forum [<http://www.gs institute.org/archives/000008.shtml>].

*Two months later he addressed a national broadcast audience in **Remarks at the National Press Club** [*linkage to be added*]. On this occasion he spoke of **the rapid changes taking place since the end of the Cold War** and his reflections of what was occurring. In his remarks he indicated*

Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons. Over time, the shimmering hope gave way to judgment which has now become a deeply held conviction: that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.

*General Butler elaborated on **his concerns** which compelled this conviction.*

- First, a growing alarm that despite all evidence, we have yet to fully grasp the monstrous effects of these weapons, that the consequences of their use defy reason, transcending time and space, poisoning the earth and deforming its inhabitants.
- Second, a deepening dismay at the prolongation of Cold War policies and practices in a world where our security interests have been utterly transformed.
- Third, that foremost among these policies, deterrence reigns unchallenged, with its embedded assumption of hostility and associated preference for forces on high states of alert.
- Fourth, an acute unease over renewed assertions of the utility of nuclear weapons, especially as regards response to chemical or biological attack.
- Fifth, grave doubt that the present highly discriminatory regime of nuclear and non-nuclear states can long endure absent a credible commitment by the nuclear powers to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
- And finally, the horrific prospect of a world seething with enmities, armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, and hostage to maniacal leaders strongly disposed toward their use.

*General Butler noted that "the world has begun to recoil from the nuclear abyss." He indicated that **a choice** must be made:*

There is a much larger issue which now confronts the nuclear powers and engages the vital interest of every nation: whether the world is better served by a prolonged era of cautious nuclear weapons reductions toward some intermediate endpoint; or by an unequivocal commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to move with much greater urgency toward the goal of eliminating these arsenals in their entirety.

***General Butler chose the latter course.** His National Press Club Remarks occurred upon the occasion of the release of the joint statement with General Goodpaster and the Statement of International Generals and Admirals. General Butler said that he had decided*

to join my voice with respected colleagues such as General Goodpaster to urge publicly that the United States make unequivocal its commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, and take the lead in setting an agenda for moving forthrightly toward that objective.

*In subsequent months General Butler continued to speak out on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. He returned to the National Press Club on February 2, 1998 and gave a speech on **The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers to Rogue Leaders.** [<http://www.gsinsitute.org/archives/000023.shtml>] Among other matters he dealt with **the legitimacy of nuclear retaliation.***

What better illustration of misplaced faith in nuclear deterrence than the persistent belief that retaliation with nuclear weapons is a legitimate and appropriate response to post-cold war threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. What could possibly justify our resort to the very means we properly abhor and condemn? Who can imagine our joining in shattering the precedent of non-use that has held for over fifty years? How could America's irreplaceable role as leader of the campaign against nuclear proliferation ever be re-justified?

What target would warrant such retaliation? Would we hold an entire society accountable for the decision of a single demented leader? How would the physical effects of the nuclear explosion be contained, not to mention the political and moral consequences? In a singular act we would martyr our enemy, alienate our friends, give comfort to the non-declared nuclear states and impetus to states who seek such weapons covertly.

In short, such a response on the part of the United States is inconceivable. It would irretrievably diminish our priceless stature as a nation noble in aspiration and responsible in conduct, even in the face of extreme provocation.

In a speech given at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library in Boston on November 22, 1998, General Butler offered a set of judgments on nuclear weapons and nuclear war, including the following:

- Nuclear weapons are not weapons at all. They are insanely destructive agents of physical and genetic terror, whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and deforming its inhabitants for generation upon generation.
- The stakes of nuclear war engage not just the survival of the antagonists but the fate of mankind.
- The prospect of shearing away entire societies has no military nor political justification.

Admiral Noel Gayler

[photo] *Admiral Noel Gayler, U.S. Navy (ret.) served during World War II as a carrier fighter pilot. His subsequent sea commands included fighter and experimental squadrons, and carriers. From 1972 until his retirement as a four-star admiral he was Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific. In 1984 Admiral Gayler offered "A Commander-in-Chief's Perspective on Nuclear Weapons" in The Nuclear Crisis Reader (Gwyn Prins, editor; New York, Vintage Books, 1984, pp. 16-18).*

[permission pending to use excerpt]

Commander Robert Green

[photo] *In his twenty years of service in the Royal Navy, Commander Robert Green (ret.) from New Zealand flew nuclear-armed aircraft for nine years and then served in the intelligence service. During his navy career he became disillusioned with nuclear deterrence. Becoming a strong advocate of nuclear abolition in his retirement, he presented his views in The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence (2000, The Disarmament and Security Center, P.O. Box 8390, Christchurch, New Zealand).*

*Commander Green summarized his thinking in an article entitled **Why Nuclear Deterrence is a Dangerous Illusion** [<http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/deter.html>], posted by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Highlights are as follows:*

- What is at stake from deterrence failing between nuclear weapon states is the devastation and poisoning of not just the belligerent powers, but potentially of all forms of life on the planet.
- Meanwhile, retention of nuclear arsenals encourages proliferation of the problem, and with it this unacceptable risk.
- The Bomb directly threatens security -- both of those who possess it and those it is meant to impress. Indeed, it is a security problem, not a solution. This is because it provokes the greatest threat: namely, the spread of nuclear weapons to megalomaniac leaders and terrorist -- who are least likely to be deterred.

General Charles A. Horner

[photo] *In his Air Force career General Charles Horner served two tours of duty as a combat pilot in Vietnam. In 1991, he was Allied Air Forces Commander in Gulf War, and from 1992 to 1994 he served as Commander of the U.S. Space Command. On July 15, 1994, just prior to retirement from the U.S. Air Force, General Horner offered his views on **the utility of nuclear weapons** at a breakfast meeting of the Defense Writers' Group. As reported in a variety of newspaper accounts, he said the following:*

- The nuclear weapon is obsolete. I want to get rid of them all
- I want to go to zero, and I'll tell you why: If we and the Russians can go to zero nuclear weapons, then think what that does for us in our efforts to counter the new war.
- The new military threat, unlike the superpower tensions of the past, comes from smaller, less stable countries that obtain weapons of mass destruction.
- Think how intolerant we will be of nations that are developing nuclear weapons if we have none. Think of the high moral ground we secure by having none...It's kind of hard for us to say to North Korea, 'You are terrible people, you're developing a nuclear weapons,' when we have oh, 8,000.

- I'm not saying that we militarily disarm. I'm saying that I have a nuclear weapon, and you're North Korea and you have a nuclear weapon. You can use yours. I can't use mine. What am I going to use it on? What are nuclear weapons good for? Busting cities. What president of the United States is going to take out Pyongyang?
- So then, you say, 'Why do I have nuclear weapons?' To use against small countries creating problems. But then you get into that moral issue...I just don't think nuclear weapons are usable.

General Horner was one of 18 military leaders who joined 21 religious leaders in signing the Joint Statement on Nuclear Reduction/Disarmament

[<http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/Nuclear02.html>] in June 2000. In his own statement [<http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/NuclearP03.html>] on that occasion he said, among other things:

- The Cold War is over. The United States and Russia no longer require the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Yet the world remains a dangerous place.
- The Statement...addresses the fact that nuclear deterrence increasingly lacks credibility, and if these weapons are retained for such purposes, it may only legitimize their use. It is hopeful, but not overly optimistic, as it calls for reciprocal and phased reductions that may require many years. It is a challenge, for while the banning of nuclear weapons is not the sole responsibility of the United States, we are in a position to lead the effort.

General Colin Powell

[photo] General Colin Powell, U.S. Army (ret.) entered the Army through the ROTC. He had two tours of duty in Vietnam and served as a battalion commander in Korea. He held a succession of military and civilian positions, culminating as National Security Adviser to President Reagan. In 1989 President George H.W. Bush appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position he held until the fall of 1993 under President Clinton. He now serves as Secretary of State under President George W. Bush.

*In a commencement address at Harvard University on June 10, 1993 General Powell spoke on **the future of nuclear weapons**.*

Today -- on what happens to be the 30th anniversary of the talks that led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- I declare my hope and declare it from the bottom of my heart that we will eventually see the time when the number of nuclear weapons is down to zero and the world is a much better place.

*Three months later General Powell articulated his views on **the utility of nuclear weapons** in a breakfast meeting with the Defense Writers' Group, held on September 23, 1993.*

- With respect to nuclear weapons, I think their principal purpose remains deterrence against a major nuclear attack against the United States, however remote that might be, and thank God it's becoming more and more and more remote.

- The second part of that, though, has to do with the fact that there are a number of nations in the Third World who think that they will gain some political or military utility through the possession of nuclear weapons. Every time I get a chance to talk to them, I try to dissuade them of that. And I make the point that I think that it's a wasted investment in a military capability that is limited in political or military utility, and that we have ways of responding and punishing conventionally that you would not wish to see us use. And at the end of the day, we have far more nuclear weapons than you do, so what's the utility that you get out of this?
- I have not been faced with a military situation in the several conflicts we've been involved in over the last four years where I thought there was going to be a need to resort to such weapons, and I'm glad that turned out to be the case. We've had two wars [in Panama and the Persian Gulf], six rescues and 22 other major events in the last four years for these reluctant warriors in the Pentagon.

*In 2001 General Colin Powell, now retired from the U.S. Army, became secretary of state in the administration of President George W. Bush. He discussed the **prospects for use of nuclear weapons** in an interview on the News Hour with Jim Lehrer on May 30, 2002. The focus was the threat of war between India and Pakistan. Lehrer asked him, "If there is, in fact, a conflict, how likely is it that it would eventually lead to the use of nuclear weapons by these two countries?" Powell replied:*

I can't answer that question, but I can say this: In my conversations with both sides, especially with the Pakistani side, I have made it clear that this really can't be in anyone's mind. I mean, the thought of nuclear conflict in the year 2002 -- with what that would mean with respect to loss of life, what that would mean with respect to the condemnation, the worldwide condemnation that would come down on whatever nation chose to take that course of action -- would be such that I can see very little military, political, or any other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it, but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age, seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating.

Admiral Stansfield Turner

After serving as Commander of a carrier task group of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (1970-71), Commander of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic (1974-75), and Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, NATO (1975), Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (ret.) was Director of Central Intelligence (1977-81).

*In 1997 Admiral Turner offered his ideas on nuclear weapons in a book entitled Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security (Westview Press). He wrote that it is time to move away from the Cold War policy of "sitting on hair trigger alert with thousands of nuclear warheads" (p.99). As an alternative (p. 102), he offered **a new vision** based on*

- Strategic escrow
- Treaty of No First-Use supplemented with sanctions
- Modest defenses

*Admiral Turner explained his idea of **strategic escrow** in a 1999 interview [http://www.cdi.org/adm/1316/stansfield.html] recorded by the Center for Defense Information.*

It's a process I call strategic escrow. It's a form of de-alerting both the Russian and American nuclear forces. You take a thousand warheads off of missiles in the United States today and you move them maybe 300 miles away, so they can't just go back overnight. You ask the Russians to put observers on that storage site where you've put the thousand warheads. They can count what went in, they can count if anything went out.

You don't need detailed verification procedures that take years to negotiate in a treaty. What you hope is the Russians then take a thousand off and put our observers on them. A lot of people think they will not, but I say they have to. It's the only quick way to avoid their having one-fourth to one-sixth the number of warheads on line that we have maybe eight or ten years from now, because of the decline inexorably of the size of their force due to the lack of maintenance.

So then we have a process going. We do another thousand, they do another thousand. I mean from today's numbers, we can be down into hundreds in a matter of, in my opinion, four or five years if we do this. And the most urgent thing for the United States today is to get the Russian nuclear arsenal off alert, get it down to as few of these as possible.

And my ultimate objective is to get every nuclear warhead in the world in escrow so nobody can pull the trigger today, but if somebody cheats, like Saddam Hussein, and decides to threaten the world because he's got the nuclear weapons that he shouldn't, then you still have the warheads in escrow and you can bring them back and say, "Saddam, you've got ten, but we just have recombined a hundred, and therefore you have no advantage. In fact, you're very vulnerable if you decide to continue threatening or using nuclear weapons."

When Admiral Turner joined military and religious leaders in the release of the Joint Statement on Nuclear Reductions/Disarmament [http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/Nuclear02.html] at the Washington National Cathedral in June 2000, he said in his own statement [http://www.nrdi.org/nuclear/NuclearP08.html]:

- We must go downward much more rapidly than we are if we are going to prevent the further proliferation of these weapons to other states as we've recently had proliferation to Pakistan and India.
- As long as the two nuclear superpowers maintain arsenals in the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, there is no way they can with any consistency urge that other nations not be allowed to acquire these weapons.

We seek the elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.

Ronald Reagan, *Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985*

I can't believe that this world can go on beyond our generation and on down to succeeding generations with this kind of weapon on both sides poised at each other without someday some fool or some maniac or some accident triggering the kind of war that is the end of the line for all of us. And I just think of what a sigh of relief would go up from everyone on this earth if someday—and this is what I have—my hope, way in the back of my head—is that if we start down the road to reduction, maybe one day in doing that, somebody will say, 'Why not all the way? Let's get rid of all these things.'

Ronald Reagan, *May 16, 1983*

As I have indicated in previous statements to the Congress, my central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. The prevention of the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries is an indispensable part of our efforts to meet this objective. I intend to continue my pursuit of this goal with untiring determination and a profound sense of personal commitment.

Ronald Reagan, *March 25, 1988*

A convention on the comprehensive ban of nuclear weapons should be negotiated. Since biological and chemical weapons have been prohibited, there is no reason why nuclear weapons, which are more destructive, should not be comprehensively banned and thoroughly destroyed. All it takes to reach this objective is strong political will.

Jiang Zemin, *1999*

The existence of nuclear weapons presents a clear and present danger to life on Earth. Nuclear arms cannot bolster the security of any nation because they represent a threat to the security of the human race. These incredibly destructive weapons are an affront to our common humanity, and the tens of billions of dollars that are dedicated to their development and maintenance should be used instead to alleviate human need and suffering.

Oscar Arias, *Former President of Costa Rica and Nobel Peace Laureate*